Snow avalanches threatening the road to the Sunshine ski area in Banff National Park, Alberta, Canada, are controlled by helicopter bombing and preplanted explosives. The effectiveness of these methods is evaluated using two ratios: avalanche points/homb and avalanche points/kiloqram of explosive, where avalanche points are computed on a scale of 1 to 5, according to size. Analysis of 74 helicopter missions shows a significant increase in avalanche points/bomb with increasing bomb mass. Comparison of helicopter bombing (near-surface detonations) with preplanted charges (ground detonation) shows that ground detonations are at least as effective as bombs detonated just below the snow surface.
I NTRODUCTI ON
In many mountainous areas throughout the world the avalanche hazard is controlled by using explosives to bring about artificial release. For example, each year in North Ameri ca a vari ety of methods are used to detonate -10 5 explosive charges on slopes with slJspected instability (Mellor 1968 , 1973 ! Perla and Martinelli 1976 , Perla 1978 , Cb]. Desplte the widespread use of explosives in avalanche hazard. control, very little is known about the best chOlce of mass and placement of an explosive to release a given slope.
In the few comprehensive studies to date, Gubler (1976, 1977[a] and Cb], 197R) reports on the attenuation of explosive energy in a level plot of snow as a function of explosive amount, position, and speed. His tests indicate that a charge detonated at or above the surface of the snow has a much greater range co';]pared to a charge buri ed in the sno~1 si nce the energy attenuation is rel atively large within the snow. Gubler (1978) presents data from Sltitzerland and Austria confirming the advantage of air propagation in the blasting of avalanche slopes, and recent experience at North Ar;]erican ski areas suggests that tI-Jere ,nay be some advantage to above-surface detonations (personal communications from L FitzGerald at SnO\~bird, Utah, and C Israelson at Lake Louise, Alberta). Thus, there is growing evidence that 222 explosive effectiveness depends on the position of the explosive with respect to the snow surface.
Detonation above the snow surface is not practical in most situations. The vast majority of explosives are hand-thrown or launched against the snow surface. If the snow surface is relatively hard, the explosive may rest directly on it during detonation, but more generally the charge penetrates into the snow and detonates at about 0.1 to 1.0 m below the surface.
Certain types of artillery rounds have basemounted fuses which require a solid impact against the surface of the ground for reliable activation. Also, in some areas where zones suitable for starting avalanches are inaccessible, a practical alternative is to preplant explosives on the ground during autumn for subsequent detonation with coded radio signals. It is not known how a charge detonated at the snowground interface compares in its effectiveness to one detonated just below the surface.
A related question concerns the effectiveness gained by increasing or decreasing the mass of explosive. Gubler found that the energy delivered to his transducers on a level plot varied as the square root of explosive mass. To date, there are no studies which confirm that square root scaling applies to the failure and release of inclined snow slopes. Moreover, there are no objective guidelines for matching the mass of an explosive to a potentially unstable slope.
One difficulty in answering the above questions is the large number of variables associated with the nature of the terrain and with meteorological factors, as well as practical constraints that are present in any study of the release of avalanche slopes. Another difficulty is the lack of a method of evaluating what constitutes an "effective" response to blasting an avalanche slope. Our present study which employs ten years of data on explosive control illustrates some of these difficulties. In spite of large statistical scatter, we will reach some modest conclusions about explosive position and mass.
AVALANCHE CONTROL DATA
The access road to the Sunshine ski area in Banff National Park, Alberta, is threatened by 14 avalanche paths which descend vertical ly -1 000 m fron starting zones -10 4 to -10 5 m2 in area. M ost of the starting zones are inaccessible to artillery or avalanche contro l teams, and transmission of explosives by cable car to detonating positions above the snow surface was judged impractical considering the vertical distance from valley bottom . Helicopter bombing was introduced in 1968, and self-consistent record-keeping of missions began with the winter 1970-71. A total of 74 hel icopter missions was flown in the period to 1981-82 . Beginning in the winter of 1974-75, helicopter bombi ng \~as suppl emented ~Ii th exp1 osi ves detonated by VHF radio, preplanted in the starting zone during the autumn 1'n accordance with techni ques descri bed by Everts and Laidlaw (1978) . A total of 38 missions based on preplanterl explosives was completed during the wi nters to 1981-82, bllt not necessar i 1y on the same days as helicopter missions flown duri n9 those years.
Of direct relevance to the questions posed in the introduction is that helicopter bombs detonate at or just below «1 . 0 m) the snow surface, depending on the snow surface hardness, and a hiays 1 ift snow and detonation gas from hemispherical bl ast craters . By contrast, prep1anted bombs detonate at the ground -snow interface \~hich, in the Sunshine area, is typically 1 to 3 m below the snow surface depending on lateness of season and snowfall amounts . Craters are small or not observed, noise is muffl ed, and usually only small amounts of snow and detonation gas are thrown upwards above the snow surface. Therefore, the records of the Sunshine control missions provide a possibilitj for comparing nearsurface and ground detonations. In addition, the average helicopter bomb mass was varied from one mission to the next (1 to 16 kg); this provides a possibility for comparing results as a function of homb mass.
All bombs contained a high percentage of trinitrotoluene (TNT), and were comparable in speed of detonation and pressure.
EXPLOSIVE EFFECTIVENESS
Avalanche size in response to an explosion was recorded on a point scale 1 to 5, based on the destructive capability of the avalanche as sho~m in Table I . The records in the present study included up to size 4 avalanches, but not size 5, which is the extreme limit for the world's largest avalanches. From the viewpoint of field observers and record keepers, the 1 to 5 scale of Table I is easy to use, will give self-consistent scores since observers wi 11 rarely di sagree by more than one poi nt, and has direct relevance to hazard evaluation . However, it is far from the hest measure of avalanche response to an explosive blast. Perhaps it would be preferable to use area and thickness of the initial slab released by the explosive; unfortunately these data were not recorded consistently. The absence of a more direct measure of avalanche response to a blast ma. v explain some of the high variance in our present results.
We assume that an avalanche larger than size 1 is an effective response to an explosion. The choice of thi s somewhat arbitrary threshol d coul d cause some of our high variance; however, the threshold should not be selected to minimize variance. In our opinion, a non-release or a sluff (size 1) is an ineffecti ve response (this is open to controversy) . For any number of bombs or missions we can therefore define two ratios which characterize the effectiveness of the bombs or missions: (a) the total avalanche points (>2) di vi ded by the total number of bombs, and (b) the toto.l avalanche poi nts (>2) di vi ded by the total mass of explosives in kg.
The simpler alternative is to equate effectiveness with the number of avalanches above a threshold (size 2 in our case), without any additional size discrimination . As explained later, we found that this alternative gave a poorer correlation with bomb loas s. We bel i eve (aga in open to controversy) that there is a need to introduce avalanche size in the measure of explosive effectiveness.
PRECIPITATION INDEX
An important complication in any comparative study of avalanche control is the variation of meteorological variables from Illission to Inission. Snowfall, precipitation, temperature, and wind data were recorded daily during the mission period frolll 1970 to 1982, inclusive of the months November to April. These data were used to derive indices by summing the data back into the past from the day of the I~ission. Analysis was made of indices based on one-, three-, and seven-day sums of the above variables. It turned out that the precipitation (in mm of water) summed for the three-day period before the mission correlated most significantly (r = 0.63) with total avalanche points. The importance of precipitation compared to the remaining variables (snowfall, temperature, wind) is recognized in many previous studies of avalanche forecasting, which usually find higher correlations between avalanche activity and preCipitation, and especially high values where explosive control is conducted durinq or im~ediately after heavy snowfall in anticipation of instability due to new snow. By contrast, in the present study missions using helicopter bombing and preplanted explosives were usually conducted during favourable weather, often r, lany days after a precipitation cycle. The intent was to force i nstabil ity in deep, Heak layers (depth hoar) usually found in the snowpack of the Canadian Rockies, as well as the possibility of forcing re l ease of the newly-fallen snow.
In any case, the precipitation history preceding a 1 . 1ission is an important variable, as we will show, and should be considered in comparing the effectiveness of missions .
RESULTS: NEAR-SURFACE AND GROUND DETONATION S
Data froh1 each mission are compiled in the appendix. These data can be grouped as shown in Table 11 which gives a comparison of 74 he1icopter-bo~bing missions (near-surface detonations) and 38 ~replanted-charge missions (ground detonations) . The 74 helicopter-bombing mission s are divided into two columns: 31 missions flown in the early years before the introduction of preplanted explosives, and 43 mi ssions flOlIl1 contemporaneously with the use of preplanteri explosives. We draw attention to the effectiveness ratio point s /kg which is significantly higher for preplanted-charge missions. This follows de spite a lower three-day precipitation history. lie also note that the ratio points/bomb of the prep l anted-charge Table 11 that ground detonations have an effectiveness that is comparable to near-surface detonations. We only resist a stronger conclusion because of the imbalance in the total amounts of explosive, but the possibil ity that ground detonati ons are better in some circUlnstances should not be dismissed.
RESUL TS: Bmm t1ASS
From Table 11 it is also possible to conclude that the effectiveness ratio points/bomb increases with increasing bomb mass. versal at 4.3 and 2.0 kg. HO~lever, an important complication is that the 3-day precipitation histories also stratify in the same order as the bomb masses, and it is therefore necessary to separate the effect of these two variables (preCipitation and bomb mass) on the points/borriJ. One method of making a separation of effects is with a two-stage regression in vlhich tile dependent vari ab 1 e is the points/bomb Y, and the two i ndependent variables are three-day precipitation Xl and bomb mass X2. Table IV summarizes the statistics of Y, Xl, and X2 from the 74 helicopter-bombing missions. First-stage correlations are summarized in Table V which indicates that Xl is the slightly stronger independent variable, and that the linear function of X2 as opposed to (X2)2,(X2)1/2, and (X2)1/3 is optimum. Because the correlations are too weak and too close to one another it is premature to accept a linear relationship between Y and X2 in preference to, say, a square-root relationship (preferable according to Gubler's attenuation measurements) as anything more than a statistical result, given the high variance of our data. 
CONCLUSIONS
Froln our study of artificial avalanche release in the Canadian Rockies by means of either helicopter bombing or preplanted explosives we conclude (1) with respect to the effectiveness of releasing avalanches, explosives detonated at the ground-snow interface are comparable to explosives detonated just below the snow surface, and (2) the probability of avalanche release increases significantly with increasing bomb mass in the range of 1 to 16 kg of high explosive.
These conclusions are based on data with rather high vari,ance (low r-values)' Further confirmation is necessary, especi ally in other areas \~here the snowpack is thicker (>2 m), where instability is ** Sum of all water equivalents of snow over 3-day period preceding mission, and measured at level study plot as in footnote*.
*** H is helicopter-bo~bing mission; P is r adio det onation of preplanted explosive. 
